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Summary
Welfare reform, if it is to be successful in the longer-term, needs to be based on a carefully
thought out political strategy.  The new political arithmetic, where the poor are an electoral
minority, and many working class voters have rising aspirations, requires welfare reform to
appeal to the interests of the majority.  While welfare reform similarly must work with rather
than against the grain of human nature, self-interest has to be harnessed in a way which
builds an inclusive programme.  The Government's drive towards ever greater means-tested
provision looks good in year one.  The penalties means-tests impose on working, saving and
honesty become apparent only later with an ever-growing proportion of the population
having to think about how best to work this system.  Equally importantly, this drive to even
greater means-tested dependency is set to blow apart some of the key characteristics which
underpin a common citizenship.Article 1
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Introduction
Thank you for extending to me the privilege of giving a Stevenson lecture on citizenship.
There is much that could be said about the founder of this lecture series, his role in your
university, city and country.  I limit myself to one matter.  At a time when the population is
aging, a man who becomes your Chancellor at the age of 83, and holds that position for a
decade, gives a fairly clear steer on how welfare might develop, particularly on where, if at
all, Governments should pitch the official retirement age!
I begin by outlining what I intend to say.  Winston Churchill, as a junior member of the Liberal
Government, turned his mind in 1908 to the question of how best to mitigate the evil
influences of unemployment on families.  He referred to this issue as that "untrodden field of
politics".
1  So too with the idea of citizenship in the English political tradition.  The word
citizenship is rarely given any clear meaning in political ideas of political activity.  It is
nevertheless of considerable political significance.
The underlying theme I wish to develop is that welfare reform needs not only to be thought
out carefully, but it has also to be backed by a coherent and inclusive political strategy if it is
to be successful.  Indeed, I shall argue that the importance of this political strategy is such
that it must help shape how the principles may be translated into working reforms.  The
expectation (certainly my expectation) was that thinking the unthinkable would form the basis
of the welfare reform strategy Labour would advance in office.  To illustrate the politics of
welfare reform I shall endeavour to introduce you to how stakeholder pensions could have
been enacted.  By turning its back on this approach the Government has been forced to
concede a growing dominance to means-tested welfare.  The consequence this has for
citizenship in the twenty-first century is the last theme on which I wish to touch.
                                                
1 Winston S Churchill, "The Untrodden Field of Politics", The Nation, 7 March 1908.Article 1
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Not by the poor alone
A new political arithmetic of our age was the starting point underpinning the politics of
thinking the unthinkable.  Expressed crudely, there have already been three periods with
their own distinct political arithmetic in modern politics.  There was, first, that which operated
before the advent of the universal franchise, which is itself a fairly recent phenomenon in
Britain, although we sometimes convince ourselves otherwise.
2
During this first stage political leaders, such as Peel and Gladstone, were adamant that
parties should not produce programmes until they were "called in" as it was known.  The
phrase, presumably, derived from the monarch summonsing or calling to the Palace, a
political leader and inviting them to form an administration.  The rhetoric was nothing if not
proud.  Politicians were there to exercise judgement and not to be swayed by the preserves
of voters.  Given this was still an age when landed magnates could and did determine not
only the choice of some candidates, but which of those candidates were successful, the "no
policy" declaration until a leader was "called in" did not fully describe the subtlety of the
political process.  Here, then, was a political arithmetic where interests were represented in
Parliament but in a manner totally foreign to our current democratic comprehension.
3
                                                
2 Some working class men gained the vote in 1867 and others in 1884.,  But the main bulk of unskilled
working men did not gain the franchise until 1918 when the size of the electorate increased threefold:
up from 7.5 million to over 21 million voters.  Women did worse.  Although they won the vote for
elections for poor law guardians, women did not gain a parliamentary vote until 1918 and even then
only did so on their thirtieth birthday.  Age equality for voting was only established in the lifetime of my
parents – in 1928 – and single voting only in my lifetime – in 1948.
3 See Martin  Pugh,  The making of modern British politics, Blackwell, 1993, for an excellent
introduction on how contemporary participants saw politics operating around the time of the Second
Reform Act.Article 1
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It is not hard to imagine the shock when someone who had made their fortune, rather than
inherited it, and done so from trade, rather than from land, challenged this thinking and
heralded the "age or ransom".  In this short, tough, explosive phrase, Joseph Chamberlain
delivered an unyielding message.  If the rich wanted to keep most of their loot they would
have to buy off poorer voters with social reform.  Here, then, was the political arithmetic's
second era.  Politicians of all parties sought an election victory on the basis of offering gains
for the working class paid for with money taken from other voters.
The age of the have nots comprising a majority of the electorate spilled over into quite recent
times.  To be a majority group does not, of course, mean that the majority voted as a single
entity.  The party of the left had to appear a credible government for that to happen.  Yet,
looking again recently at the Socialist commentary's Must Labour Lose?
4  report, I was
struck by just how large a proportion of voters in the 1960s still thought of themselves a
working class and belonging to a party which championed the under-dog.
The politics of ransom provided a political cover for the poor.  We are still talking of a time
when there was a large overlap between being working class and being poor.  There were
marked differences, of course, between those at the top and at the bottom end of the
working class income spectrum.  But there was enough common ground still to make an
electoral appear relevant to poor and non-poor working class alike.
Protecting and promoting the interest of the poor today takes us into political arithmetic's
third age.  A sizeable part of the working class and lower middle class now have incomes
which given them for the first time real choices.  They rarely look to those below them.  They
associate themselves increasingly with the aspirations common amongst those higher up the
social hierarchy.  Gaining reforms paid for by someone else's money is one matter.  Being
expected to pay for your own reforms puts the issue into a different focus.  Moreover, payingArticle 1
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for the reforms over which you have little say is guaranteed to generate friction.  This third
age is therefore one where consumer interests replace the dominance of producer interests.
A ration book fare from central government has less and less appeal for these new
discerning consumers.  Choices can and are made.  Look, for example, at how the holiday
trade has been transformed.  It was not that long ago when the so-called enlightened middle
classes scoffed at the idea of working class people holidaying abroad.  Similarly, the left, in
particular, has been loath to enfranchise public sector consumers.  Yet within the severe
restraints imposed upon them many voters are trying to insist on choice in what is offered by
what remains of the public sector.
In the third age of political arithmetic the traditional approach to social reform no longer
commands enough support.  Rousing calls of fraternal greetings, of common endeavours
and the like, are important for the political platform, although, even here, the audience has
for the most part quietly tip-toed away.  Altruism alone is not strong enough or durable
enough to sustain a radical programme.  An appeal to self-interest of the majority has to be
clearly pitched, and it is only within this appeal that the interests of the poor can now be
advanced.
Self-interest and the common good
The role of self-interest raises a second strand of the politics of thinking the unthinkable.
Self interest is basic and intrinsic to human nature.  How otherwise would mankind ever
survive?  But while self-interest is distinct from selfishness, and selfishness is a different
stimulus   from  greed, self-interest  does  not  automatically  preclude,  or  even  necessarily
                                                                                                                                                       
4 Mark Abram, Richard Rose and Rita Hinden, Must Labour Lose?, Penguin, 1960.Article 1
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preclude altruistic intent.  In the post-Freudian age we perhaps ought to know better than to
asset a purity of motive for any single action or thought.  I would guess that altruism is very
often underpinned by self-interest.  (It certainly is in the USA where it is tax deductible!)  That
is not in any way to devalue altruistic intent.  It certainly does not lessen its effect.  It is
merely to draw attention to a force strengthening its durability.
The new political arithmetic demands that if policies are to have a chance of being carried at
the election they must have a majority appeal.  But it is possible to make such a pitch, and
make the approach comprehensive in order to include the poor.  Of course a majority appeal
does not automatically ensure comprehensibility.  But these two goals are not inevitably
opposed.
To illustrate the other assumptions which underpinned the political strategy of thinking the
unthinkable I wish to concentrate on pensions reform.  It would be possible to recast
stakeholder pensions from its present mould shaped by the personal pension regime and to
build it as a guarantee offering a pension valued at a set level of average earnings.  Such a
scheme would see the achievement of a number of aspects of thinking the unthinkable.
It would establish a link between self-interest and the welfare of the poorest.  A pension
guarantee set as a percentage of average earnings cannot be bought in the private market
other than by the seriously rich, and they, not surprisingly, are unlikely to be interested in a
stakeholder guarantee.  Such a guarantee can only be offered to ordinary voters if it is
underwritten by the community as a whole.
Universal but not state
This form of stakeholder pension illustrates how universal coverage can be gained in an era
of non-government provision.  Indeed, looking beyond government may by the  only meansArticle 1
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by which a new universalism can be established in respect of pensions which is, after all, by
far and away the largest item of expenditure in the traditional welfare budget.
The proposal I put forward in government was for new recruits to the labour market to be
required to contribute to a funded pension as well as their national insurance pension.  The
aim of both contributions would be to accumulate funds sufficient to offer a stakeholder
pension set at a high enough proportion of average earnings to ensure that all pensioners
were lifted free of means-tested entitlement.
The funded side of the scheme would not be divided up into little personal pots of wealth, as
is the norm for personal pensions, but kept as part of a number of larger investment funds.
Contributors would be able to opt for one of the funds, and move between them.  The selling
of stakeholder would be allowed only through membership owned bodies.
Compulsion is crucial to the success of this proposal.  All those in employment above a very
low income threshold would have to be in a stakeholder pension scheme.  But, because of
the attractiveness of the idea – it cannot be bought elsewhere – self-interest could allow
some form of graduated contributions – ie, self-interest could support the altruistic objective
of raising the funds within the scheme to include the poor.
Sending the right message
This is not the place for the full details of this proposal, but one important advantage of such
an approach is that it would send out all the right messages on work and saving.  This is in
stark contrast to the messages emanating from the Government's means-tested Minimum
Income Guarantee.  This means-tested approach results in possibly 40 per cent of the
working population being unable to save enough to provide an income greater than that
which comes from the Minimum Income Guarantee.  Saving has become worse than a
useless activity.  It is positively dangerous to the financial health of a very significantArticle 1
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proportion of the population.  And this is not simply a debating point.  The Government's
short term Minimum Income Guarantee reform undermines the sense of saving for the long-
term.  Already there is evidence showing retired lower paid workers with small occupational
pensions finding themselves worse off than neighbours who refused membership, and also
those who had the money but who refused to save, preferring to spend today and let
taxpayers look after them tomorrow.  What message does this send to the next generation of
potential savers?
A universal stakeholder pension can guarantee that all those on low incomes will keep all the
savings they have made in addition to their contributions towards a stakeholder scheme.
None will be clawed back through any means-test.  It also sends out the right message to
those who cannot work at any one time.  Providing people in this category fulfil the
conditions as a carer or, as unemployed people, are actively seeking work, their
contributions will be paid each year to the stakeholder pension plan.  This group of the
population would therefore know that when they are able to work again they would be
building upon an accumulating pension entitlement, and not be faced with the prospect of
perhaps being too old to join a pension scheme.
Transparent redistribution
This single pension reform illustrates three other aspects of the political strategy aimed at
fundamental welfare reform.  First, the age when taxpayers are prepared to finance
significant unconditional redistribution is passing.  This is not to say that redistribution is
impossible.  It is, however, a plea to stand conventional wisdom on its head.  Rather than the
redistribution being hidden from the electorate as the only way of achieving this end, it needs
to be made transparent.  If this redistribution is to be sustained over the longer term it also
needs to be lined to encouraging behaviour that taxpayers believe enhances the public
good.Article 1
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The pension scheme I have described sets out to meet these objectives.  The extent of
redistribution is there for everyone to see.  Indeed, it might be said that the scheme errs on
the side of rubbing the noses of contributors into this very fact.  This transparency is, I
believe, crucial.  The standing of politicians is low.  Political activity is mocked, if not
despised.  To try and hoodwink voters on this, or any other major issue, might work for a
while, but it courts a nasty backlash when voters rumble, as they surely will, what the hidden
agenda is.
Best form of contract
Next, the scheme also builds on the belief that, while no arrangement can be expected to
last into the very long-term, history points to some contracts having a longer life expectancy
than others.  In welfare there are two ways of financing a pensions programme, apart from
the short-term expedient of borrowing from abroad.  Both make claims on any year's national
income.  The first attempts to bind taxpayers into transferring income.  The second is to build
up holdings of capital, and for this capital ownership to be used as a means of lodging a
claim on any year's national income.  And both approaches are necessary, I believe, in any
sensible welfare settlement.  But, on the question of extending welfare provision, for that is
what pension reform is fundamentally about, I believe the balance of argument is in favour of
greater funded provision.  History teaches that, in this country at least, claims on national
income by way of dividend payments are met more easily than taxpayers finding themselves
committed by previous generations to a high level of taxation.
5
But funding is not the panacea that it is often thought to be.  Indeed, the one which holds the
better track record for delivering payments, via wealth holdings, could be overturned if a
future generation feels that the wealth holders have an unfair claim on national income.  The
overturning may come by political means, ie, through the ballot box.  Or the challenge could
                                                
5 This was the line argued in the welfare reform Green Paper, entitled significantly, New ambitions
for our country – a new contract welfare, HMSO, 1998.Article 1
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be economic, whereby workers push up inflation to cut the real income levels of wealth
holders.
A third political judgement centres on what the best arrangements might be for spreading
risks common to practically the whole community.  Here the debate is usually crudely
polarised, with collective provision being pitched against market arrangements.  But
collective provision here does not mean state provision, and collective provision can be such
as to draw upon a market spirit in its administration.
Collective non-state provision
From the perspective of the years just prior to the outbreak of the First World War most
observers would have predicted that Britain's welfare would continue to develop along the
highly decentralised lines of membership owned organisations.
6 This is not the place to
discuss why, 50 years later, this country had one of the most highly centralised and
government run welfare states in the free world.  What is important is to register that the
"coming of the welfare state", as so many text books bill these events, was neither inevitable
in this form, nor did it mark the utopian end game as far as welfare was concerned.
Collective provision is still the best way to advance in covering common risks.  With risks
spread over the greatest number of people, average costs are low.  As cherry picking is not
allowed, taxpayers are not left to underwrite the costs of those with the greatest risks who
the market refuses to cover.  But collective provision is not necessarily synonymous with a
state run system.  Here was another key political judgement.  Welfare expenditure needs to
increase –  we are, for  example,  living  decades  longer  and pensions therefore need to be
                                                
6 Jose Harris, "Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940", Past and Present, May 1992.Article 1
12
drawn over a much longer time span.  Yet individuals generally are resistant to increased
taxation, and increased state provision, as a means of delivering this expanded welfare
package.
The increasing cost of welfare might be borne collectively, and therefore offer cover to the
poor, if new membership based organisations were established to control and handle the
assets, and to distribute the benefits.  In other words, by putting government, as we currently
know it, at arms length.  By achieving this goal – and so allowing comprehensibility – another
equally important goal is achieved.  Welfare reform dovetails with the more traditional
constitutional reform debate.  But in place of devolving power to geographical regions, this
programme of reform is about extending the power of individuals within new membership-
owned organisations.  Increasing individual control over welfare assets is, I believe, the quid
pro quo of an agreement to save more for a better pension income in the future.
A major task is completed.  I have outlined the politics which underpin the welfare strategy I
hope the Government in the not too distant future will implement.  But there is one part of the
story which waits to be recalled.  The Government's rhetoric about welfare is markedly
different from the line pursued in opposition.  Are we in a new era?  Or is the old welfare
wine merely being put into new bottles?  And does the course of reform which is now being
pursued strengthen or destroy one of the major supports for a common citizenship?
New labour or old policies?
Let us go back to the labour Opposition's central attack on the Tory's welfare budget.  While
there was a sense of shock when the leadership realised that by far and away the largest
part of the Government's budget – a cool third – went on welfare, the rate at which this
budget was growing, and the negative impact of means-tested welfare on behaviour also
became a matter of major political concern.Article 1
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Indeed, the attack on means-testing was linked to the growth in the budget.  By far and away
the fastest growing part of the welfare programme was the means-tested element.  That
proportion of the budget stood at 35 per cent in 1997, up from 13 per cent in 1979.  The
number of people living in households with a least one member dependent on means-testing
had doubled during this time, from one in six to one in three.
The Labour Opposition Front Bench rounded on a government forcing an ever-growing army
of pensioners on to means-tested income support.  Family Credit – a subsidy to low wage
earners – was condemned in similar fashion.  It sustained the evil of low wages, it benefited
scrooge employers and, by subsidising their wage bill, it not only created unfair competition
but distorted the market by its downward push on low wage rates.
The government claims it has halved the growth in the overall welfare budget.
7  Two reasons
principally account for this trend.  The buoyant economy has played a positive role.  In many
areas of the country, but alas not all, the increase in the number of jobs has ensured that
there is work for people anxious to move off welfare.  A series of Tory welfare cuts – hotly
opposed by the Labour Opposition – are now in place and having a downward push on the
size of the welfare bill.  People's entitlements to some benefits have been cut or abolished.
The Government's welcome welfare to work strategy is also a factor in the equation.  But its
importance in reducing unnecessary welfare expenditure is not comparable to these other
two factors.  Indeed, its costs, so far, outweigh its benefits in terms of reduced welfare
expenditure.  The programme's impact will however be felt in the longer-term.  Welfare to
                                                
7 The claim is even more impressive than this.  The current spending plans to 2001/02 project an
average increase of 0.2% each year (excluding tax credit) or 1.1% (including tax credits).  This lower
rate of growth is largely attributable to a real terms fall in benefit expenditure in each of 1997/98 and
1998/99.  Growth in each of the three subsequent years, ie, after 2002, is expected to be well above
that in each of the last three years of the Conservative Government.Article 1
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work signals a change from what might best be called a passive welfare system, with an
operation largely concerned with paying out benefits, to a proactive one which weights the
crucial task of paying benefit with an equal concern with helping people into work when that
is a realistic possibility.  The change in public culture these series of welfare to work
measures will bring about should not be under-rated.  But they are not, as yet, a major
influence in the fall in the rate of growth of welfare expenditure.
Behind the bravado claims of welfare success – the "cuts" in what the budget was forecast
to be, falling numbers of young unemployed, the numbers generally moving from benefit to
work – lurks the acceptance of an every-growing role for means-tested welfare.  Sooner or
later this development will derail the welfare reform strategy on which the Government has
now embarked.
Means tested welfare
The strategy's presentation is nothing if not ambitious.  Just as redistribution has fallen out of
the political vocabulary, to be replaced by the concept of fairness. The terms Minimum
Income Guarantee and tax credits are used as dazzling headlights.  But these headlights are
mounted on to the front of a means-tested bandwagon.  And no amount of inventiveness
over names will prevent the huge downside any means-tested strategy drags in its wake.
The attack on work, savings and honesty is inevitable, and the more ambitious the strategy
the greater the destruction on these fronts which will be wrought.
The Government's pension strategy already illustrates how short-term means-tested
expedience can undermine noble long-term objectives.  So as to provide more generous
pensions in the future the Government's longer-term strategy is to reverse the current 60-40
rate of publicly financed pensions to private pension provision.  A second overall objective is
to reduce the number of pensioners on means-tests.  If everything goes as planned, the
Government's long-term reform will see the proportion of  pensioners so dependent onArticle 1
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means-tests falling from one in three to one in four of the pensions population 50 years
hence.  And this modest, but not unimportant reduction, assumes the extent of means-tested
help to current pensioners will have no adverse long-term effect on savings.
To make this assumption, however, is to stretch realism beyond the bounds of possibility.
Buying the new stakeholder pension will be voluntary.  Rebates will encourage target
workers to joining, but there will be no compulsion.  And, as I have already noted, at the
same time the means-tested Minimum Income Guarantee is currently offering a growing
proportion of the population a pension which is more valuable than anything they could
acquire by saving.  An army of pensioners who did save now would find themselves worse
off than if they had simply squandered every penny the had ever had.  The dignified but
quiet anger expressed by pensioners writing from around the country who feel mocked by a
government which rewards those who did not save – I accept there were some who could
not have saved – and rely on future taxpayers to look after them, will not only be registered
in a lower turnout at the next election if no action is taken, but within the extended families of
these pensioners a most profound questioning is taking place.  If work the system is well
rewarded why not join the crowd?
Extending means tests
In his budget statement, in little more than an aside, the Chancellor hinted that pensioners
would in future be covered by a pensioner credit system.  Quite what this involves is as yet
unclear.  What is clear is how extensive is the spread of the tax credit system to those of
working age.  The flagship in this whole enterprise is the Working Families Tax Credit which
subsidises low wages and pays a handsome contribution towards child care.  So generous
are the proposals that a family with three children may have an income of £40,000 a year
and still be claiming the Working Families Tax Credit.Article 1
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But there is a down side to this means-tested approach of making work pay.  From net
income of £91 and above, families face a withdrawal rate of 55p on the Working Families
Tax Credit for each £1 rise in earnings.  When income tax or National Insurance are added
in the tax credit marginal withdrawal rate peaks at 70 per cent, or up to 95 per cent with
housing benefit and council tax benefit withdrawal.  This is at a time when the 40 per cent
marginal tax rate is thought to be the highest that should be levied on top income earners.
Means-tests, it has to be admitted, do encourage entrepreneurial skills.  But they are skills
associated with working the system and they feed the black market or hidden economy.
Means-tests encourage and reward dishonesty.  Family Credit, the  WFTC's predecessor,
invited collusion between employers and employees.  Wages were paid at a minimum.
Family credit payments came in at a maximum and large sums of cash were drawn on the
firm's bank account each week.  Employees picked up part of their wages in cash,
employers reduced their wage bill at the expense of taxpayers.
The National Minimum Wage builds a floor below which wages cannot legally be paid.  This
is an important reform, but between an hourly rate of £3.60 and £5.00, no wage increase can
financially improve the worker's take-home pay.  As with Family Credit, the Working Families
Tax Credit will push low wage rates down towards the national minimum.
We are not talking of a means-tested welfare system affecting a small, declining proportion
of the population.  The current means-tested strategy will cover 40 per cent of the
population, up from a third under the Tories.  Once the pensioner credit system is introduced
this proportion will surge above the 50 per cent mark.
The lure of the tax credit is powerful.  But it is essentially a short-sighted strategy.  It offers
significant increases in take home pay.  But workers so rewarded find themselves trappedArticle 1
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on a welfare treadmill.  Next year marginal tax rates of up to 95 per cent will slash any pay
increase.
We were told not long ago that you cannot buck the market.  Indeed, but the political system
bucked the person who told us this truth.  Similarly, a welfare reform programme cannot
buck human nature.  One key aspect of thinking the unthinkable was that welfare had to
work with, rather than against, the grain of human nature.  Like the bricks made without
straw, first appearances tell us nothing about durability.  But just as those bricks did not last,
disintegration under the lash of wind and rain, so too a Minimum Income Guarantee, or a tax
credit system, cannot survive in the longer-run, no matter how creative the name of the
means-tested benefit.
Ricocheting onto citizenship
Tax credits are presented as a simple and efficient means of making work pay.  They
certainly achieve this goal in their first year of operation, but, as I have already suggested
the longer-term impact on a worker's net pay is less straight forward.  But tax credits are not
simply about modernising the tax and benefit system.  They also have the potential to glow
apart a major part of the current political agreement on citizenship.
The authority the Government claims for its lurch into tax credits is an apparently innocent
sounding sentence in the manifesto.  It reads: "We will keep under continuous review all
aspects of the tax and benefit systems" adding, ironically, as matters have turned out "to
ensure that they are supportive of families and children".
8  The adequacy of such an oblique
authority for a revolution in taxes and benefits may be left unchallenged with the
Government has a majority of 180 behind it.  But this administration has embarked on a high
                                                
8 New labour: because Britain deserves better, 1997 Manifesto, 25.Article 1
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risk strategy.  It is undermining a widely accepted agreement on how people should be
treated in some very basic respects, and how to pay for a major part of the Government's
programme, without discussion let alone testing the consequences of such a momentous
change.  Whether the Government realises how profound a change it is attempting to the
basis of citizenship in this country is in some doubt.
Just how profound a change is being undertaken is brought into focus if we look at the 1945
settlement which the tax credit system seeks to replace.  Not for the first time Jose Harris
plots the subtle movement of debate over the decades which led to the advent of this
contract-based citizenship.  An insurance based agreement was established, and remained
"extraordinarily tenacious" because it "fitted in with the current principles of fiscal reality, and
with current evaluations of virtue, citizenship, gender, personal freedom and the nature of
the state".
9
Destroying the 1945 settlement
Tax credits strike at each of these foundation props of the 1945 settlement.  Let me
comment on each aspect, taking first the view about fiscal reality, of people's willingness to
pay for a major part of the Governments programme.  The Chancellor has yet to state that
he views insurance contributions as anything but a tax.  In the television broadcast following
his first budget he referred ominously to the National Insurance tax.
What is the sense of regularly referring to a "National Insurance Tax" when voters stubbornly
refuse to see it as such and insist on it being an insurance contribution?  The Tories
ruthlessly mined this particular electoral seam.  Major increases were also made to National
                                                
9 See Chapter 6, "'Contract' and 'Citizenship'", in A Selsdon and D Marquand, The ideas that shaped
post-war Britain, Fontana, 1996, 137.Article 1
19
Insurance contributions and yet, because cuts were made to the rate of Income Tax, the
Conservatives fought successive elections as a low tax party, and were believed.
The Chancellor's strategy becomes even more surprising when other attitudes of taxpayers
are brought into view.  We live in an age when voters will vote against the party seen to be in
favour of increasing direct taxes.  Steadfastness on this issue in the privacy of the ballot box
belies whatever is whispered to pollsters.
In contrast to a marked hostility to raising direct taxation, a hostility which is spreading to
indirect taxes, the voters offer Chancellors a hand of friendship on the question of insurance
contributions.  Such contributions are emphatically not seen as taxes.  What sense can be
made of the current Chancellor's campaign to equate insurance contributions with a
taxation?  Can such regular "slips" be put down to carelessness?  Or does the Chancellor
have a longer term game plan which he is loath at present to disclose?  Is the aim to abolish
the National Insurance system?
Foundation stones of citizenship
Next, what impact will tax credits have on the gender basis of citizenship?  Both Eleanor
Rathbone and William Beveridge, along with their campaigners, supported a work-based
National Insurance system because they saw work in the home as equally valid, and an
activity to be rewarded through the insurance system.  Our age is still working through a new
gender contract, with perhaps much distance still to go.  But the threat that tax credits pose
to independent taxation, to take one item from the gender contract, is only slowly being
recognised.  Yet each political concession to re-establishing principles of independent
taxation with a tax credit system makes what was allegedly a simple administration of tax
credit into one with considerable complications.  And one which is more intrusive.
Employers have never had to know as much about the private living arrangements of asArticle 1
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many of their workforce as they now must know as the administrators responsible for tax
credit payments.
How well does today's National Insurance system fit with other underpinning views on
citizenship – of virtue, freedom and the nature of the state – all of which Jose Harris sees as
crucial to the 1945 settlement?  Of course the system needs to be modernised.  Above all it
has to become a scheme where the contributor genuinely feels ownership.  But the
underlying values of the scheme are, if anything, more relevant now than half a century ago.
The belief that people should look after themselves, if at all possible, remains as strong as
ever.  Work, savings, and honesty, it is believed should be rewarded and not penalised.  Tax
credits, the Minimum Income Guarantee, and their like, attack each of these three aspects of
the good society.  They also attack what is commonly regarded as an important aspect of
freedom.  A citizen's immediate well-being is enhanced by means-tested help.  But an
effective counter-poverty strategy is not simply about increasing the  poor's immediate
income, important as this is.  For the long terms success it is crucial that the means by which
the income of the poor is increased simultaneously widens their freedom.  Means tests,
because benefits are reduced or withdrawn as income rises and because savings can
disqualify  a person from help, place a heavy penalty on telling the truth on either of these
two accounts.  Means tests in the short run increase the poor's income, but only at the great
cost of narrowing their freedom.
Conclusion
Let me briefly summarise the points which I have been trying to make.  There is a technical
side to welfare reform.  How are the details of policies worked out?  But, of equal importance
are the politics of welfare reform.  Welfare reform will not be successful if it ignores a number
of crucial points on the political compass.Article 1
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Welfare reform which is beneficial to the poor can only be successfully pursued in the longer
run within a framework in which the self-interest of the majority is served.
Universal provision must still be a goal for basic welfare.  But in this new political age
extending the principle of universalism will only be realisable within a system of joint public
private provision.  The phrase private provision should not be simply equated with private
company provision.  Private provision, ie, non government provisions, can still be a collective
provision with welfare provided through membership-owned bodies.
Human nature cannot be written out of the equation.  No matter how beguiling a welfare
reform programme is, if it works against the grain of human nature, it will fail.  This will be the
fate of the tax credit and Minimum Income Guarantee reforms.  The Government will soon
learn that human nature is not for turning.  Worse still, this misadventure blows apart some
important sentiments which underpin a common citizenship.Version II
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Abstract
The eastern enlargement of the EU resembles German unification in its momentousness.
Whereas the latter led to a 26% increase in the population of the Federal Republic, the
former will increase the population of the EU by 28% if all ten entry aspirants are accepted.
A special problem will be posed by migration.  Given the existing wage differences between
eastern and western European countries, a massive westward migration can be expected
after enlargement.  A temporary east-to-west migration until the eastern countries create an
efficient capital stock makes economic sense if this is driven by wage differences and meets
with a flexible labour market.  Migration does not make economic sense, however, if, and to
the extent that, it is induced by the current social assistance systems.  Moreover, welfare-
motivated migration would create competition among western European states to frighten off
potential migrants, and this would lead to an erosion of the traditional social welfare state.  If
the EU plan incorporated limitation on the free movement of labour, beneficial migration
would also cease.  A better solution would be to limit access to the western social systems,
at least for a transitional period, in order to filter out migration induced by differing social
standards.  An EU-wide application of the home-country principle in the granting of social








With the introduction of the Euro and the eastern enlargement of the EU, the European
Single Market is nearing its completion.  Within the foreseeable future, 25 European
countries will be joined in a unified economic region in which the four basic freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome will be largely fulfilled.  People, capital, goods and
services will be able to cross European borders unimpeded, and when Cyprus and Turkey
are EU members, these freedoms will be extended into Asia Minor.  Economic freedom is
the foundation for the utilisation of trading advantages and specialisation benefits that result
from a prospering European economy, but it will also cause problems that need to be
recognised and solved at an early stage.
Eastern enlargement is not insignificant. It will increase the EU population from 375 million to
480 million or by 28% and this does not include Turkey with its 70 million people.  It would be
disastrous to stumble into EU eastern enlargement as unprepared as Germany was for its
own eastern enlargement.  Then the population increased by 26% and this led to
considerable economic problems.
One of the problems of eastern EU enlargement is the fiscal burden that will result when the
existing assistance programmes are extended to the new EU citizens.  The agricultural
subsidies that comprise 45% of the EU budget are prominent among these.  In Poland there
are ten times as many people of working age in agriculture than in Germany, and a linear
extrapolation of current EU subsides results in expenditures of an additional 0.8% of the
western European GDP for the agricultural sector when all eastern European accession
candidates are accepted.  This is a problem, albeit a minor one.  Of greater importance is
the adjustment pressure that will be placed on the national political decisions of the western
EU countries from the mobility of people and businesses.
Europe stands at the threshold of a new phase in its development, characterised by a fierceArticle 2
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competition of systems between the institutions of the old national states.  In a Europe of 25,
the national states will no longer be able to act in the isolated fashion as they once could.
Opening the borders forces them, on the one hand, to compete with lower taxes and a good
infrastructure for the investment and location decisions of private firms.  On the other hand,
every state will be on its guard because a generous social system may induce migration
streams of the needy that may turn it into a "poorhouse" of Europe.  Competition among
countries has its strengths, but its impact on the institutions of the social welfare state is not
promising.  The migration of people and businesses threatens to trigger off deterrence
measures that could lead to an erosion of the social welfare state.
Often it is argued that the competition between countries is similar to that of firms in the
market, that Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand is operative here, too. I doubt that, particularly
when it comes to the competition among welfare states, and I shall try to explain my doubts
in this lecture.
The Extent of Mobility
Guest workers and poverty refugees from eastern and south-eastern Europe are already
flocking into western Europe, either enticed by the extremely high wage differences or forced
to migrate because of catastrophic conditions in their home countries.  In the large EU
member states such as Germany and France, the foreign population is more than 6%, and
all estimates point to further increases in the coming years.
Particularly high mobility is expected for people in the ten eastern European countries that
are negotiating for EU membership, since their standard of living will not approximate that in
the west for some time to come.  Wages in eastern Europe are one tenth to one fifth of those
in western Germany or one fourth to one half of German welfare payments, at least
according to present exchange rates. In Munich the average hourly wage in the engineering
industry is DM 28.50 compared to DM 4.80 in west Poland and DM 2.70 in east Poland.  InArticle 2
26
real terms, the discrepancy is not quite so large due to the lower prices of non-traded goods,
but it is still considerable.  Given the size of the discrepancy, it seem likely that eastern EU
enlargement will lead to substantial westward migration.
The first wave of accession, which will include five countries, is now expected to come by
2004 at the latest. Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary with a total of
63 million people will then be members of the EU.  Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and
Bulgaria with another 42 million people are determined to follow soon. Even under the most
optimistic assumptions of the growth rates of the EU candidates, it will not be possible to
raise average wages to 20% of western German wages or to one half of German social
welfare assistance by the scheduled time of entry.
According to recent estimates by Zimmermann and Bauer
10 in the case of a longer restriction
of the freedom of settlement, a total emigration of 2.7% of the population of the new member
states can be expected.  However, for the case of EU membership with free migration, the
study arrives at a much higher figure (Table 10, p. 51).  No less than 6% of all Poles, 16% of
all Bulgarians and 27% of all Romanians can be expected to leave their countries.  On
average, 10.6% of east Europeans will leave their countries if they can, and this is a total of
11 million people if all 10 applicants are admitted.
These figures are confirmed in a poll carried out by the International  Organization for
                                                
10  Thomas Bauer and Klaus F Zimmermann, Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and its
Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and East Europe, Study for the UK
Department for Education and Employment, IZA, Bonn 1999. In Table 10, which presents the results
of the econometric estimates, the authors only publish country-specific emigration numbers. The
aggregate numbers quoted in this article are the direct result of weighting with individual population
shares. The authors relativize their results and reach the conclusion that a migration of between 2-3%
of the home population is to be expected. They do not mention whether this number refers to the case
of free or restricted migration. Since the first column in Table 10 has a value of 2.7% for the case of at
times free migration and at times restricted migration in the form of quotas, it can be assumed that the
summary only refers to this case.Article 2
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Migration (IOM).
11 The poll reveals that about one fifth of Slovenians, Poles, Hungarians and
Czechs, and even one third of Romanians would choose to emigrate for several years if they
could.
For the case of a politically non-restricted emigration, the Ifo Institute
12 came to somewhat
more modest estimates of about 6% to 7%, of which about 4% to 5%, or 4 to 5 million
people, would have Germany as their goal.  In contrast to the numbers of Zimmermann and
Bauer, these results are estimated on the basis of an approach that adjusts for eastern
Europeans already living in the EU, and they also refer to an longer period of estimation
which extends from 1974 to 1997 instead of 1985 to 1997.
A look at the migration from Turkey is also instructive.  Today, about 5% of the Turkish
population lives in western Europe.  If, like the Turks, only 5% of the new eastern European
EU citizens came to western Europe, this would be more than five million people.  Because
eastern Europeans will enjoy the freedom to settle in Germany, this is probably at the lower
end of plausible estimations for the case of unrestricted migration over a 15 year period.
It is sometimes argued that the previous experience with Spain and Portugal suggests that
there will not be much migration from the east, when the freedom of settlement is granted.
However, this is a misinterpretation of the Iberian experience for a number of reasons.  First
of all, there was a six-year transition period after joining the EU during which migration was
largely forbidden.  Second, the wage gap then was much smaller than it is now between
eastern and western Europe.  In the years before membership started, Iberian wages were
about 47% of the west German wages; by contrast, the average wage in the five eastern
applicant countries is currently only 13% of the west German wage.  (The respective figures
                                                
11  International Organization for Migration, Migration Potential in Central and Eastern Europe, UN
Sales No. E.98.III.S.18, New York 1998.Article 2
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for all 10 applicant countries are certainly much smaller, but reliable information is not
available.)  Third, and most importantly, much of the migration potential may already have
been exhausted before Spain and Portugal became members. In the sixties, both countries
had dictatorships but did not forbid their citizens to travel abroad.  Thus many people fled
and sought protection in EU countries. Between 1960 and 1974, the accumulated Iberian net
emigration was 5,5%.  When Spain and Portugal applied for EU membership in 1977 and
became members in 1986 most of the potential migrants had already left, and many of them
actually took the opportunity to return.  This scenario is very different from the situation in
eastern Europe e. When the eastern population lived under communist dictatorship a tight
Iron Curtain effectively prevented emigration, and when the Iron Curtain was lifted, the west
decided to no longer accept easterners as political refugees.  As of today, therefore, the
migration pressure has not yet been released.  Indeed a mass migration can be expected
when the right to settle freely is granted to the people in the east.
Westward migration will have strong implications for the western European social welfare
systems, since the decision of which western country to migrate to will primarily be
determined by economic incentives.  To be sure, a large income differential is necessary to
induce people to leave their home countries, but once this decision has been made, the
choice of the destination country will be influenced by even small differences in living
standards.  Thus, a nearly perfect  differential mobility among the western European
countries can be expected, and the pressure on present social systems will be enormous.
Deterrence Measures
The benefits of the social welfare state will become a problem in this situation, because they
attract migrants who are net recipients of public resources.  The western European countries
will endeavour to examine their social benefits so as not to provide unnecessary migration
                                                                                                                                                       
12 See Hans-Werner Sinn,  Gebhard  Flaig, Martin  Werding, Sonja  Munz, Nicola  Düll, Herbert
Hofmann, EU-Erweiterung  und  Arbeitskräftemigration: Wege  zu  einer  schrittweisen  Annährung  derArticle 2
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incentives.  Since poverty refugees' choice of country will depend on where the most
extensive social benefits can be expected, there will indeed be a competition for the most
effective deterrents, and each country will try to be less attractive than its neighbours. In the
competition for the lowest possible social standards, the European social welfare state will
be exposed to strong erosive forces which threaten its very substance.
The competition for effective deterrents does not presuppose that migrants are attracted by
social benefits alone.  This connection is ruled out because recipients of social benefits need
to have present or prior employment, according to present EU law.  The marginal migrant
makes a contribution to the GDP of the host country which is equal to his or her gross wage
income, and the infra marginal migrant makes an even larger one.  Thus his wage is not a
burden for the citizens of the host country, and therefore no political deterrent measures are
induced.
The problem arises, however, in the form of state income redistribution for the benefit of
workers with lower wages.  Low-income workers pay little or no taxes, but they are entitled to
supplementary welfare payments for themselves and their families, their children enjoy free
schooling, they have access to public housing programmes, they gain from the redistributive
elements in the health insurance system and, last but not least, they profit from the
infrastructure the state provides free of charge.  These benefits imply that the marginal low
income immigrant receives more than he or she produces or pays in taxes.
On the basis of the socio-economic panel, the  Ifo Institute calculated the amount of net
resource transfers from the state to the immigrants.  Included were all social insurance
contributions and taxes as well as all services received including the social benefits financed
by taxes and payroll deductions and the proportional costs of the public infrastructure that
the immigrants use.  The results are that during the first ten years in Germany, immigrants
                                                                                                                                                       
Arbeitsmärkte, Ifo study commissioned by the German Ministry for Labour and Social Order, 2001.Article 2
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register a net per-capita resource gain of DM 4,600 a year.  This is no small amount; for a
five-member family it adds up to DM 230,000 in ten years.
13
The state, seeing the budget constraints caused by immigration, will reduce its social
benefits fearing that these may act as a magnet in attracting immigrants. Its motto will be
fairness but less generosity than its neighbouring states.  Since all governments will act the
same way, the benefits of the welfare state will be gradually reduced.  The process of
change in political values will take somewhat longer since the political climate, and with it the
ideals of the socially oriented parties, will only change slowly.  Perceptions and ideologies
that have formed over the decades will be subject to creeping erosion, hardly noticeable at
the outset but which will receive an additional push with every new generation of politicians
and which will ultimately be expressed in a different understanding of the state, more like
that in the United States than the one now common in Europe.
It is true that the challenge to the social welfare state from the migration process is not
harmful in every respect.  The state's influence on the lives of its citizens is too extensive
and the false incentives it creates are too many.  The traditional social welfare state creates
a strong incentive to avoid the labour market.  Typically, social benefits are received as long
as one does not work, and they are lost when, and to the extent that, labour income arises.
This type of welfare needs to be thoroughly reformed, and, if such reform is touched off by
migration-induced financial problems, this can only be welcomed in principle.
The problem is, however, that even a well-constructed social system that rewards own
initiative rather than idleness will be eroded by the systems competition.  A well-constructed
welfare system helps people help themselves, it provides  workfare instead of welfare,
because workfare makes wages flexible downward and creates additional jobs.  Germany’s
traditional welfare system implies a minimum wage which is about 70% of the median wage.
                                                
13  See Sinn et al., op. cit.Article 2
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By way of contrast, the U.S. earned income tax credit in itself implies no minimum wage, and
the legal minimum wage is only about 30% of the median wage.  The earned income tax
credit shows how, from every dollar that the government is prepared to spend for welfare
measures, a maximum of social policy objectives can be achieved.  This is a prime example
of a social system that encourages own initiative, although its level is far too low by
European standards. Unfortunately, however, even a well constructed social welfare state is
not protected from the erosive forces of systems competition.  The essence of a social
system is the redistribution from rich to poor, including the working poor, and it is this
redistribution that will erode, for the reasons given above, regardless of whether it is well or
poorly constructed.
From a theoretical perspective, a more fundamental reason for the erosive force of systems
competition can be seen in a policy externality that is created by a national redistribution
policy.  A country that makes gifts to the poor and forces the rich to finance these gifts
induces the rich to go abroad and the poor to come from abroad. In this way the country
reduces the real wage of the factors of production offered by the rich in other countries andArticle 2
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increases there the real wage of the factors offered by the poor.  Thus the wages for skilled
labour and the rate of return on capital will fall abroad and the price for expensive real estate
will rise.  Conversely, wages for simple work abroad will rise and the price for basic real
estate will fall.  Moreover, the outflow of net payers of government benefits and the
immigration of net recipients will produce government budget surpluses in other countries
that can be used for social purposes.  The degree of target fulfilment for foreign social policy
will be increased without foreign governments’ own efforts.  At the same time, the degree of
target fulfilment for domestic social policy will be weakened since the departure of the rich
and the entry of the poor will increase the gap between the gross wage rates of the factors of
production offered by these groups.  From all this, it follows that some of the equalising
effects of domestic social policy will be distributed abroad by factor migration and will be lost
domestically.  This policy externality reduces the domestic incentive to maintain the welfare
state.
In the theoretically extreme case of a small country and perfect mobility of the affected
population groups, the effects of national social policy would fall completely on other
countries.  The domestic net-of-tax income distribution would then be determined exclusively
by conditions abroad regardless of the national redistribution efforts, and it would be
meaningless to pursue a national social policy.
A Comment on Social Standards
Some commentators have feared that the competition between countries touched off by
migration will also erode the social standards in connection with the workplace.  The 1989
European Social Charter refers to these standards and includes workplace safety, working
conditions as well as in-company training and education.  The fear of an erosion of working
standards is unsubstantiated, however, as can easily be demonstrated since measures for
workplace safety and comfort have little in common with state redistribution measures.  They
are a wage-equivalent compensation in kind that has a value for employees but that also,Article 2
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just as cash wages, makes the factor labour more expensive. In terms of this compensation
in kind, an optimistic view of systems competition is justified since countries will endeavour
to create an optimal mixture of monetary payment and compensation in kind in order to
attract as many mobile workers as possible and thus maximise the income of immobile
factors that co-operate with these workers and profit from them.
If a state increases its monetary transfers to poorer people, it diverts the migration streams
into its own country and, as has been explained, it lowers the gross incomes of those it
wishes to help.  If, however, the same state increases safety standards marginally, it will not
create any migration effects provided that wages are determined competitively and that the
standards have been chosen optimally.  Since, in the national policy optimum, the marginal
cost of workplace safety equals its marginal benefit, an increase in standards will only lead
to an equivalent lowering of monetary wages, and the migration incentives will remain
unchanged.
Of course, the full equivalence no longer applies when wages are not flexible or when
workplace standards have not initially been optimally chosen.  But this by no means
presents a policy externality that would create similar doubts on the effectiveness of systems
competition similar to those applicable in the case of redistribution measures of the social
welfare state.  This is a point that is overlooked not only by many critics but also proponents
of systems competition.  It is only the redistribution measures that can be eroded.
Haider, Harmonisation or Home-country Principle
The looming erosion of redistributive policies calls for counter measures if one is in favour of
redistribution in itself, for instance if the redistributing state is seen as insurance against
career and life risks that are not privately insurable.  A particularly simple, but just as
problematic, protective measure is postponing the freedom of settlement and erecting a legal
wall in place of the physical wall that was torn down ten years ago.  Votes can be gained byArticle 2
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proposing such a system, as Haider's success in Austria has shown, but it involves throwing
out the baby with the bath water.
Preventing free migration thus also means not enjoying the welfare gains that such
migration, in principle, can be expected to bring about. A migration free of artificial incentives
would only lead to the number of guest from eastern countries that would make the marginal
migration cost equal to the wage difference between east and west, and this is precisely is
the welfare-maximising rule for the allocation of the existing European work force, provided
that the wages equal the marginal productivity of labour in the countries involved. If a Polish
worker is induced to give up his Polish job for one in Germany, then Poland's GDP will fall
and Germany’s will rise. As long as the increase in the German GDP exceeds the reduction
of the Polish one, the overall European GDP will increase, and, as long as the increase in
GDP is larger than the Polish worker’s migration cost, a welfare gain arises.  Migration is in
principle a good thing, especially since the initial wage difference leads us to expect an
export of capital to Poland, an increase in wages there, and a later return of the guest
workers. In the transitional phase up to the convergence of the eastern European economies
to those in the west, a temporary westward migration of some of the working population is a
welcome development.  The problem is not that such migration takes place, but that the
western European social welfare states create an excessive migration incentive.
To remove the excessive migration incentive, thought could be given to harmonisation of the
social systems.  There would indeed be no artificial incentives to westward migration if the
same social standards prevailed everywhere. Harmonisation at the level of the eastern
countries, i.e. at one tenth to one fifth of the current western level, would be tantamount to
the state calling for a revolution in western Europe, and harmonisation at the western level
could not be financed either by the east or the west.  Extrapolating from the experience of
German unification, the burden will amount to 5-7% of the western European GDP, which
surely no one in the west would accept, let alone the west Germans, who already transferArticle 2
35
4.5% of their GDP to east Germany every year.
Only two alternatives remain.  The first is to select immigrants by their income, wealth or skill
levels to make sure that no net recipients of public resources are allowed to enter.  Although
this approach is chosen by some immigration countries, it does not seem appropriate to the
European Union.  It is a crude interventionist approach, relies on the wisdom of bureaucratic
decisions, and discriminates against weaker immigrants from the new EU countries.
A much more sensitive, market-oriented, and just approach is the application of the home-
country principle wherever this is possible.  Instead of restricting the freedom of settlement,
bureaucratically selecting workers, or harmonising social standards, access to the benefits of
the western social systems can be limited.  Either the claims for social benefits should be
directed towards the home country, or benefits in the country of residence should only be
paid to the amount they would be paid in the home country.  Benefit to the migrants as well
cannot be prevented for many redistribution element s. But, in a new EU treaty, social
welfare, housing grants, the rights to be considered for municipal housing and similar
benefits could be converted to the home-country principle so as to avoid a net fiscal
incentive for the migrants.  Calculations by the  Ifo Institute indicate that this would be
sufficient to generate a balanced fiscal stance for the migrants.  Currently, one of the basic
EU rules is that people are entitled to social transfers from their country of residence, where
they either both live and work or have worked.  Only tourists and visitors are treated
according to the home country principle. If entitlements could only be claimed from the home
country under its conditions, there would be no more artificial migration incentives, and the
hope that the free migration decisions people make would approach an optimum level would
be justified.  This would also be an effective check on the erosive forces of systems
competition.
The home country-principle in welfare benefits has been in use among the Swiss cantons forArticle 2
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some time and has proven to be effective.  How the home-country principle should be
implemented in detail must be the task of thorough political and economic analysis.  It is
certain, however, that this principle in the EU-25 will be a prerequisite for creating the
desired freedom of job selection in the first place.  Without this principle, there will be such
serious negative effects, both with regard to people's migration decisions and the stability of
the western social systems, that fears will be raised as to the process of European
integration itself.  Haider’s success should be a warning.
Many may consider the application of the home-country principle as a historic step
backwards that violates the principle of the inclusiveness of the social welfare net.  It is also
to be expected that the EU membership candidates will oppose the home-country principle,
fearing that their guest worker families in EU countries will be at a disadvantage.  It must be
recognised, however, that the other available policy alternatives are by no means more
attractive for the new EU countries.  The restriction of the freedom of settlement or the
selection of easterners who are allowed to migrate would mean even more exclusion than
the home-country principle, and the harmonisation of the social systems to the western level
would lead to an increase in the minimum wages of the new EU countries, which would
induce mass unemployment.  Even if the western countries were willing to pay the costs of
mass unemployment in eastern Europe for several years, such a transfer of the German
solution to Europe would not be in the interests of the new EU countries since their
economies would then never prosper.
Today we have two  Mezzogiornos: one is in southern Italy, the other in east Germany.
Harmonising social standards after EU enlargement will mean that we have another ten
Mezzogiornos in Europe.
The eastern countries will probably strive for a rapid integration without any “ifs” and “buts” in
the framework of current EU law.  This cannot be accepted by the west, however, becauseArticle 2
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of the destructive implications for its own social systems.  The membership candidates must
be told where the negotiable limits are and it must be made clear to them that immediate
integration on the basis of the residence-country principle would have such socially
explosive potential in the west that, ultimately, the social and political stability that the
eastern European countries wish to participate in by their membership would be jeopardised.
Here, the home- country principle is indeed the better alternative.  It avoids the limits to
freedoms that some are already proposing and it preserves the west's commitment to
integration.
The home country principle for tax-financed social benefits is based on economic principles
that are incompatible with the juridical concepts that have shaped current EU law.  The
immediate inclusion of migrating workers and at the same time the exclusion of people who
have migrated for other reasons has been the guiding principle of EU law. This is a political
problem that must be overcome.
The problem is not really prohibitive, since EU eastward enlargement is in itself not possible
on the basis of the current legal situation.  Much change is needed, and the conversion from
the residential to the home-country principle is only a small reform measure.  To be sure, EU
expansion can only be discussed on a de lege ferenda basis, i.e. in terms of legal reforms,
and not de lege lata, in terms of what can be done without changing the laws.  Since the
enlargement of the EU and the underlying conditions must be agreed unanimously, every
EU country can demand adjustments in the prevailing laws.
It is true that it would be desirable for political reasons that the home-country principle be
introduced in such a way that only a minimum of legal changes are required.  Attention must
be given in particular to the already negotiated association treaties between the EU and the
eastern European accession countries.  These agreements call for integrating the migrating
workers from the first day of their work in the contribution-financed social systems, i.e. inArticle 2
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particular in the statutory health insurance system, the pension system, and the
unemployment insurance scheme.  Moreover, they are obligated to pay taxes, and they of
course cannot be excluded from using the public infrastructure.  The agreements do not
stipulate how the tax-financed social benefits should be handled.  An exclusion of the
migrants from supplemental social benefits, from housing allowances and the already scarce
municipal housing would not be in contradiction to the association agreements but would
help to balance the net fiscal losses and would prevent a harmful competition among welfare
states to reduce benefits.
Possible legal reservations can be countered by limiting the exclusion from certain social
benefits to a certain period of time.  Since the integration of the immigrant improves over
time, his market income approaches the domestic average, thus eliminating the net fiscal
losses for the state. A waiting period of 5 to 10 years up to full integration of the immigrant in
the social welfare system of the host country should suffice to avoid the net fiscal losses.
For this proposal, the Ifo Institute has coined the phrase "selectively delayed integration" of
immigrants in the social welfare system.  Integration is not prevented but only delayed, and it
is not delayed in general but only selectively, namely for the tax-financed social benefits that
are not covered in the association agreements.  Selectively delayed integration is an
alternative to the quota system for integration favoured by politicians which calls for a
selection of individuals and which deprives many eastern Europeans of the freedoms
contained in the Treaty of Rome.  In weighing up the various legal rights that are up for
discussion, priority should be given to the rights contained in the Treaty of Rome and they
should be protected from too strict an interpretation of the inclusion principle.
This proposal is a variation of the home-country principle
14 and the “delayed integration” for
                                                
14  Hans-Werner Sinn, Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe, European Economic
Review 34, 1990, papers & proceedings, pp. 489-504.Article 2
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all social benefits that the Scientific Council of the German Federal Ministry of Finance called
for in a recent study.
15  The proposal has arisen from efforts to create conditions for
competition among social welfare countries to restrict the erosive forces of free migration
with as few changes as possible to current EU law.
Final Remarks
Europeans have expressed great misgivings about the Euro although it was clear that the
Euro would have no immediate consequences for actual commercial transactions.  In
contrast, eastern EU enlargement, which is currently attracting little public attention, is a very
great problem which approaches German unification in terms of its significance and difficulty.
German unification was carried out by political fiat without consideration of economic factors,
and how expensive it was is clear today.  Even after ten years every third mark spent in
eastern Germany comes from the west, and the national debt continues to grow to finance
unification.  It almost seems as if similar mistakes are about to be repeated at the European
level.  Hardly anyone in Brussels is looking at the question of the reforms of European social
law that will be necessary to master the challenges that will come.  All attention is being
focused on the progress the eastern European countries are making to adjust to western
laws, as if the western European countries and the EU are ideally prepared for enlargement.
The carefreeness with which people refuse to analyse the economic issues fatally resembles
what was observed during German unification.  “Full steam ahead” is again the motto, and
after the fact the accusation will again be made that economists failed to give advance
warning of the problems.
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2001 Berlin.Article 2
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in future years while increasing competition will reduce the scope for some forms of
regulations. The paper concludes that countries need to look for new ways to provide social
protection.
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THE GROWTH OF SOCIAL PROTECTION
The period of globalization that ended with the First World War occurred in a world without
formal governments systems of social protection.  For the 1870-1913 period, the ratio of
public spending in GDP was very low, by today's standards.  For a group of 18 countries,
including many of those now referred to as welfare states, the share of public spending into
GDP was, on average, about 11-13 percent over this 43 year period.  See  Tanzi and
Schuknecht (1997).  At that time public expenditure as a share of GDP for the group of
countries averaged: for education about 0.6 percent; for health 0.3 percent of GDP; for
pensions about 0.4 percent; and public expenditure for unemployment compensation and for
other transfer programs was insignificant.
16
After that period, public spending started to grow mainly as a consequence of changing
social attitudes.  Especially, after the Second World War many countries, and especially the
European countries, developed formal, government financed, systems of social protection
that aimed at protecting citizens against risks associated with old age, illnesses, various
forms of incapacity, unemployment, and poverty due to particular situations such as
becoming widows, orphans, or being part of large families.  The growth in public spending
occurred in periods when countries were still relatively closed.  By the time globalization was
in full swing, the systems of social protection had reached maturity.
17
Governments have tried to provide social assistance and protection to various groups
through the use of three instruments, namely, (a) public spending, (b) the tax system, and (c)
the regulatory framework.  To some extent each instrument has been preferred in particular
countries and at specific times. In some countries taxation has been the instrument of
choice. In others, it has been regulations. In many countries it has been public spending.
However, in most countries these three instruments have been all jointly used but in varying
proportions.  Thus, some countries have ended up with large public spending, others with
high and much distorted tax systems, while still others have ended up with overregulated
economies.  Some have combined all these characteristics.
Figure 1 provides a simple, schematic view of the structure of the arguments presented in
this paper.  Social protection is seen to be influenced by the three instruments mentioned
above and these instruments are in turn shown to be influenced by globalization.  Thus, it
will be argued that globalization affects social protection mainly through the impact that it has
on these instruments.  Of course, to the extent that  globalization also changes social
attitudes towards social protection, it may have a direct impact not channeled through the
instruments.  In the rest of this paper we discuss the actual and future impact of globalization
on these instruments.
                                                
16 Information on the growth of public spending since 1870 in 18 advanced countries is available in
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000).
17 For a good description of a mature social protection systems, see Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health (Helsinki, 1999).Article 3
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Figure 1
Impact of Globalization on the Instruments of Social Protection
Social Protection
    
SOCIAL SPENDING
While public spending started rising during and after World War I, its growth remained
modest until the 1950s.
18  Between 1960 and 1980 a large increase in public spending took
place in all industrial countries but especially in the European countries.  For 18 advanced
countries combined for which information is available, average, unweighted  public spending
grew from about 28 percent of GDP in 1960 to about 43 percent of GDP in 1980.  For the
European countries in the group the increase was somewhat larger.  If attention is focused
on public spending for subsidies and transfers in the European countries in the group, its
share of GDP rose from 10.8 percent of GDP in 1960 to 24.0 percent of GDP in 1980.  See
Table 1. A large part of the increase in public spending was accounted for by increases in
subsidies and transfers which were the basic ingredients of the welfare state.
Table 1 also shows that the rate of increase slowed down considerably in the period after
1980: the average grew by only 2.8 percent of GDP in the next 15 years compared with
13.2 percent of GDP in the previous 20 years.  In non-European, advanced countries, the
increase in the share of subsidies and transfers in GDP over the 1960-80 period was only
half that of the European countries.  Among the latter, the Netherlands, Sweden, France,
and Belgium were the leaders with increases of 27 percent, 21 percent, 18.5 percent, and
17.3 percent of GDP respectively.  The 1960-80 period saw the maturation if not the genesis
                                                
18 However, by 1950 some economists and political scientists were already expressing concern about








of the welfare state.  Country after country increased public spending in an attempt to reduce
various risks.  The risks of becoming illiterate, ill, old, or unemployed received particular
attention and various public programs were developed or strengthened to deal with them.
Table 2 shows the contribution to the increase in public spending over the 1870-1995 period
accounted for by education, public health, public pensions, and unemployment
compensation for a group of industrial countries.  These categories accounted for a large
share of the total increase in public spending.  Given the existing programs, public spending
for health and pensions can be expected to continue growing because of demographic
changes.  Thus, if unchanged, these programs will require growing public resources.
Table 1
Government Expenditure on Subsidies and Transfers
(Percent of GDP)
1960 1980 1995
France 11.4 24.6 29.9
Germany 13.5 16.8 19.4
Norway 12.1 27.0 27.0
Spain   1.0 12.9 25.7
United Kingdom   9.2 20.2 23.6
Austria 17.0 22.4 24.5
Belgium 12.7 30.0 28.8
Ireland NA 26.9 24.8
Italy 14.1 26.0 29.3
Netherlands 11.5 38.5 35.9
Sweden   9.3 30.4 35.7
Switzerland   6.8 12.8 16.8
Average 10.8 24.0 26.8Article 3
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Source: Adapted from table 11-4 of Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000).
Table 2






1870 1937 1960 1980 1995
Government
Consumption




  1.1   4.5   9.7 21.4 23.2 
(2)
Education   0.6   2.1   3.5   5.8   6.1 
(3)
Health 0.3   2.4   5.8   6.4 
(4)




  1.3   0.3   0.8   1.6 
(6)
Interest   2.5   3.5   1.4 




  2.0   3.8   3.2   3.5   2.9 
(8)









Source: Adapted from various tables in Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000)Article 3
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TAX EXPENDITURES AND REGULATIONS
Tax Expenditures
While public spending has been the preferred or the obvious instrument for providing social
protection to the majority of the population and most economists associate the welfare state
with that spending, the  structure of the tax system has also played a significant role in
promoting social protection especially in some countries.  This role is additional to the one
that the tax systems have played through their financing of public expenditure in ways that
did not lead to inflation or to excessive increases in public debt.  The tax systems have often
been used to support certain socially desirable activities through the provision of "tax
expenditures".
19  Tax expenditures became especially significant in Anglo Saxon countries
which showed more resistance to large increases in public spending.
Tax expenditures are implicit incentives to specific activities given through the tax system.
Up to a point they may substitute for, or be equivalent to, public spending in the
government's pursuit of particular objectives.  For example, a government that wants to
promote education can (a) spend more money on it so as to lower its cost for the students or
their families; (b)  subsidize the students through vouchers or through other means; or
(c) allow the students or, more often, their parents to take a deduction from their taxable
incomes for money spent for tuition, textbooks or other school-related activities.  The value
of the tax expenditure to those who benefit from it depends on the level of the statutory tax
rates of the income tax.  Given that in the period after World War II tax rates became very
high in the majority of industrial countries, the value of the tax expenditures became also
very high for many taxpayers.  The personal income tax became the instrument of choice for
this kind of social engineering.  As a consequence, in some countries, this tax became very
complex as more and more social objectives were pursued through tax deductions against
taxable income, that is through tax expenditures.
20
The tax systems of many countries have been characterized by various tax expenditures
provided in support of socially desirable objectives.  For example, in some countries, some
educational expenditures have been allowed to be deducted from taxable incomes and
these expenditures have also been exempted from indirect taxes. S  ome health
expenditures have received similar treatment in addition to the fact that the implicit income
value of health benefits provided by employers has not been taxed.  Pensions have received
favorable treatment either because the pensions received by the pensioners, or the earnings
of pension funds, have not been taxed; or because the contributions to pension schemes by
the individuals or their employers have received favorable treatment.  Furthermore,
individuals with particular disabilities or conditions, such as blindness or other handicaps or
                                                
19 The concept of tax expenditure was developed in the United States in the 1960s.
20 In some countries other taxes such as the value-added tax, social security taxes, and property
taxes have also been adapted to the particular situation of the individuals.Article 3
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simply old age, have received some tax advantages such as, for example, double personal
exemptions in the United States or reductions in the property tax liabilities. Large families
have been often favored by particular provisions in the laws and working families with low
incomes have received special deductions, such as earned income credits.
There have been some tradeoffs between the use of tax expenditures and direct social
spending in the sense that a larger use of tax expenditures by a country has been
accompanied by lower direct social expenditure.  These tradeoffs have been particularly
pronounced when activist governments have been faced with strong constraints on their
ability to increase spending.  This has been the case for example with Italy during the race to
meet the Maastricht criteria or with the United States during the Clinton administration when
there was a Republican majority in Congress.
21
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially in the Anglo Saxon countries, tax expenditures
came under strong criticism because of their impact on the domestic playing field and on the
nominal tax rates, and because of the complexity that they brought to the tax systems. Major
tax reforms were introduced in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United States,
Australia, and a few other countries during the decade of the 1980s.  These reforms aimed
at reducing tax expenditures and tax incentives in general and at widening the tax bases
thus permitting a reduction in the statutory tax rates.  Because of the reduction of the
statutory rates, the value of the remaining tax expenditures was also reduced.  These
reforms represented an indirect attach on the welfare state by conservative governments.
22
Regulations
Many countries have pursued their social objectives not through public spending or tax
expenditures but through regulations.  In fact, one could almost speak of a  regulatory
welfare state.  To understand this concept, it is necessary to recognize that, in their effects,
many economic regulations can be equated to taxes, subsidies or, in some cases, to both.
Through particular regulations, a government can, subsidize some individuals and tax others
without having to actually collect taxes or spend money, i.e., without any impact on the
budget.
A good example is rent controls which implicitly subsidize those who are occupying rented
houses while they tax the owners of these houses: because of rent controls, the renters pay
less rent; and the rentiers receive less rental income.  Under the normal assumption that, on
the average, the owners are richer than the renters, this policy represents, at least initially, a
way of redistributing income.  At least in theory, the government could get similar results by
explicitly taxing the owners and explicitly subsidizing the renters.  This, however, would
increase both the tax burden and the level of public spending.  Another example is minimum
                                                
21 For the United States see Toder (2000). See Tanzi (1968) for cross-country comparisons.
22 In the United States where the 1986 tax reform reduced many of these tax expenditures, recent
years have seen some reintroduction of them.Article 3
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wages that implicitly subsidize those who receive a wage that may be higher than they would
have received while taxing the employers. It is easy to see how regulations can be
manipulated to become instruments for promoting some forms of social protection.
These regulations are likely to reduce the efficiency of the economy.  Also, their long run
impact may be different from the initial impact, because incentives may be set in motion that
over the years lead to different and unintended results.  For example, rent controls may
discourage the building of new houses or the renting of existing houses thus progressively
reducing the supply of rental housing and increasing the rents paid by individuals with low
incomes who do not already benefit from controlled rents.  Additionally, regulations often
lead to corruption.
Social protection has been promoted through the regulations of  labor markets, housing
markets, financial markets, the market for (or better the access to) several public services,
and through other channels.
Labor markets have been distorted by regulations that make it difficult to fire workers, even
when their performance is poor, that give hiring preference for particular individuals such as
war veterans, handicapped, widows, orphans, unemployed, heads of families, or other
individuals who are in situations which seem to justify some form of social protection.  Also,
at times, wage differentials have been artificially constrained in an attempt to improve the
standard of living of low skilled workers.
23
Housing markets have also been used to favor particular individuals by making it difficult for
the owners to reclaim rented apartments. Banks have been forced to provide subsidized
loans for activities considered of high social value, as for example, to students; or public
financial institutions have been set up to achieve similar objectives.  Particular individuals
have received preferential treatment (i.e., lower costs) in their consumption of electricity,
gas, water, public transportation, health, education, and food.  Public enterprises have
occasionally been forced to continue providing services at high costs to poorer areas or
poorer individuals for social reasons, or to retain workers that were no longer needed.
Enterprises, both private and public, have been forced to provide various social services to
their workers and their families or to the communities in which they operated.
24  Price
controls have been used to implicitly subsidize poorer groups.
The use of regulations to promote social protection has received almost no attention on the
part of economists.  Thus, there has been no analysis of what could be called a regulatory
welfare state.
25  However, a general movement against many regulations started in the late
                                                
23 For example, "In Germany the lowest wage is 70 percent of the average wage; in the United States
it is 30 percent" See Hans-Werner Sinn, 1999, The IFO Viewpoint (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung).
24 In the planned economies, especially, public enterprises were largely responsible for many
social services which should have been provided by the government.
25 To a large extent centrally planned economies were extreme versions of regulatory welfare states.Article 3
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Seventies and Eighties and, in attempts to increase the efficiency of the market, some
regulations were reduced. As some of these regulations were connected with the existence
and the activities of public enterprises, the movement toward privatization also played a role
in their reduction.
GENERAL IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION
The impact of globalization on the welfare state may come from various channels, some
more general than others.  It may come from the increasing competition that globalization
brings about and thus from the need for more efficiency.
26  It may come from the increasing
mobility of factors of production, especially financial capital and individuals with great ability.
It may come from international pressures to level the regulatory playing field or to introduce
uniform standards or codes of conduct.  These channels are likely to become more
important with the passing of time.  Thus, effects that are barely noticeable now will become
more visible later.
Globalization tends to raise the share of trade in gross domestic products and, as a
consequence, to expose inefficient sectors or industries to greater foreign competition.
Enterprises or workers that have operated behind the protection offered by high tariffs or by
other protective policies may find themselves without such cover.  This applies especially to
public enterprises engaged in industrial production.  For some of the countries belonging to
the European Union, the help that occasional devaluation had offered in the past is no longer
available.  In this swim or sink environment the need to become more efficient becomes
obvious.  But efficiency depends, in part, on the actions of the enterprises and the workers
themselves and in part on policies.  A country that imposes high taxes or other constraints
(say a very short work week) on its enterprises and workers puts them at a potential
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis enterprises that operate in different environments.
With globalization financial capital and highly skilled or highly talented individuals become
more mobile because their options expand to other countries.  High taxes or too constraining
regulations create strong incentives for them to move elsewhere.  The loss of highly talented
individuals and the outflow of financial capital can have a negative effect on the growth rate
and on the tax revenue of a country.  In an open world where foreign competitors face lower
taxes and fewer constraining regulations, it becomes more difficult and more costly for a
country to maintain high taxes and more regulations.Article 3
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Globalization brings strong pressures on the international community to level the
international field in which individuals and enterprises operate.  Thus, existing rules about
foreign trade, the environment, cultural and health related protection, the operation of
financial sectors, transparency in fiscal accounts and in accounting standards in general, will
be scrutinized and, when needed, changed.  The current ongoing discussion about remaking
the architecture of the international financial system is, in a sense, a movement toward the
leveling of the international playing field.  In this environment it will become progressively
more difficult for some countries to maintain the tax burdens necessary to sustain high levels
of spending, or to continue to use regulations and tax expenditures to promote, through
them, the current levels of social protection.
Impact through the Tax System
While globalization may affect the existing welfare states in different ways, the most direct
and powerful impact will come through the tax system.  There is now a growing literature on
globalization and tax systems so that there is no need to repeat the arguments presented in
that literature. See  Tanzi (1995).  For the time being there is no evidence that the tax
systems of the industrial countries are collapsing.  On the contrary, for many of these
countries the level of taxation is at, or close to, the historical high.  However, in most
countries in recent years, the tax level has stopped growing and, in a few, it has even
declined.
While the fiscal house is still standing and looks solid, one can visualize what could be called
“fiscal termites” busily gnawing at its foundations.
27 These include:
a. Increased travel by individuals which allows them to shop, especially for expensive
and easily transportable items, in places where sales taxes are lower.  This creates
incentives, especially for small countries, to reduce excises on luxury products in order to
attract foreign buyers.
28  This form of tax exporting and of tax competition will progressively
reduce the degrees of freedom that countries have had in imposing excise taxes on many
                                                                                                                                                       
26 Globalization and especially the Internet provide much more timely information on prices and other
relevant variables, thus increasing competition.
27 For a detailed discussion of this issue see Tanzi (2000).
28 Some airports have become huge shopping centers.Article 3
51
high-priced products.  In fact, revenue from excise taxes, especially if gasoline and tobacco
products are excluded, has been falling rapidly in recent years;
29
b. Increased activities on the part of some highly skilled individuals conducted outside
of their countries which allows them to underreport or not to report at all their foreign
earnings; at the same time, more and more individuals are now investing their savings
abroad.
c. A growing use of electronic commerce and electronic transactions in general
largely taking place outside of the tax system.  Electronic commerce has been growing very
fast and is expected to reach high volumes within a few years.  A large share of the world
commerce, and especially that among enterprises, could soon be channeled through the
Internet.  Electronic commerce is going to be a nightmare for the tax authorities.  This
commerce is accompanied by some important changes.
The first change is that from real transactions, requiring papers which leave more easily
traceable foot prints for the tax authorities to follow, to virtual transactions which leave much
less identifiable prints.  If origin-based taxation should prevail, sales establishments would
choose to locate themselves in places where there are low or no sales taxes.  But
destination-based taxation may be very difficult to implement especially in a world set to
facilitate foreign trade.
30
The second is the increasingly important change from the production and sale of physical to
digital products.  Many products which have been traditionally sold in shops, and in a format
that gave them some physical content, will lose their physical characteristics and as a
consequence the territoriality of the sales outlets will be more difficult to determine.  Music,
writing, photos, financial advice, engineering plans, movies, medical advice, educational
services, books, and so on can now be downloaded directly over the Net.  Furthermore, the
downloading can be done from almost anywhere in the world.  In these circumstances, the
meaning of tax jurisdiction becomes vague. See Kobrin (1999).  Who should pay the tax and
who should collect the money?  And how should this be done?  The full implications of these
changes are still barely understood.
d. The growing importance of  off-shores and tax havens as conduits for financial
investments that has been stimulated by the flow of digital information that allows money and
knowledge to be moved easily and cheaply in real time.  Estimates of these deposits are in
the range of US$5 trillion. See UN (1998, p. 71).  It is unlikely that many of those who earn
incomes on these deposits report them to their national tax authorities.
e. The growth of new financial instruments (e. g. derivatives) and agents for channeling
savings (e. g. hedge funds).  Many hedge funds operate from off-shore centers and are not,
or are little, regulated.  Furthermore, there are huge problems of identification of individuals,
of transactions, of incomes, and of jurisdictions where the individuals live or where the
incomes are generated.
31
f. The growing importance of trade that takes place within multinationals, among their
different parts situated in different countries.  This trade now accounts for a large and
growing share of total world trade.  It creates enormous problems for the national tax
                                                
29 See OECD, Revenue Statistics (2000).
30 To give a sense of the difficulties, in 1999, 475 million people, 123 million vehicles, and 21.4 million
import shipments came into the United States.  See Flynn (2000).  Controlling these movements is
almost impossible.
31 Often it is difficult to distinguish regular incomes from capital gains and many countries do not tax
capital gains.Article 3
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authorities deriving from the use of "transfer prices" by the multinationals and from the
likelihood that some of these enterprises manipulate these transfer prices to move profits to
the jurisdictions where taxes are low. Under present tax arrangements this problem is likely
to grow. The tax authorities of many countries are now worried about this trend but are often
at a loss on what to do about it.
g. The growing reluctance or inability of countries to tax, especially with high rates,
financial capital and also incomes derived by individuals with highly tradable skills.  High
tax rates on financial capital or on highly mobile individuals provide strong incentives to
taxpayers to move the capital to foreign jurisdictions that tax it lightly or to take residence in
low tax countries.
h. The gradual substitution of  real money with  electronic money in transactions
requiring money.  The money accounts of individuals are embedded in the chips of
electronic cards which are used to make payments and settle accounts.  This trend would
surely increase the difficulties of the tax authorities.  See King (1997).
These are examples of the brave new world we are entering and of the fiscal termites that I
mentioned above.  It is possible that the world community might be able to develop ways of
dealing with some of them or of introducing new taxes.  However, it is unlikely that these
actions will succeed in killing the fiscal termites.  Thus, the conclusion must be that it would
be prudent for many countries and especially for the welfare states to begin preparing
themselves for what could prove to be significant falls in tax levels in future years.
The fall in revenue might come at the same time when governments experience the need for
more spending in particular areas, either as a consequence of the aging problem or of
globalization itself.  Under current policies the ongoing demographic changes will create
strong pressures on governments to spend more for health and pensions.  These effects will
become particularly pronounced, in many countries, in about a decade from now when the
baby boomers will begin to retire.  But by that time the effects of globalization on the tax
systems could become particularly strong.
Globalization may create pressures for increased spending for education, training, research
and development, the environment, infrastructures, and for institutional changes partly to
increase efficiency and partly to comply with international agreements.  These expenditures
are consistent with the traditional or basic role of the state in its allocation function.  Thus,
expenditure for social protection, which is a newcomer in the role of the state, could beArticle 3
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squeezed between falling revenue and increasing needs for more traditional types of
spending. In such a situation, the state will need to rethink its role in the economy.
Impact through Tax Expenditures and Regulations
WHILE THE MAJOR IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON SOCIAL PROTECTION AND ON THE WELFARE
STATE IS LIKELY TO COME FROM THE TAX SYSTEM AND FROM ITS REDUCED ROLE IN FINANCING
SOCIAL SPENDING, TAX EXPENDITURES AND REGULATIONS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED.
To the extent that globalization reduces the level of taxation and especially the role of the
personal income tax, it will also reduce the possibility that tax expenditures can be used to
promote social protection.  Tax expenditures have been essentially tax incentives given
through the income taxes.  And tax expenditures for social purposes have been given mainly
or almost exclusively through the personal income tax.  This tax has been the fundamental
instrument for pursuing social engeneering through the tax system.  Lower rates and more
tax coordination among countries will reduce its role as an instrument of social protection.
AS FAR AS REGULATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THEY WILL ALSO BE AFFECTED BY AN INCREASINGLY
MORE GLOBALIZED WORLD AND BY THE PRESSURE IT WILL CREATE FOR COUNTRIES TO BECOME
MORE COMPETITIVE.  F OR EXAMPLE THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND THE
LIBERALIZATION OF LABOR MARKETS WILL BE PUSHED BY THE NEED TO BECOME MORE EFFICIENT.
The New Architecture of the International Financial system is promoting common standards
and codes for financial and other markets that will tend to make the use of regulations more
uniform and thus it will reduce the freedom that governments have had to use regulations as
instruments for pursuing social protection.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The discussion in this paper leads to the conclusion that a process of deep economic
integration among countries will require a change in the role of the state in pursuing social
protection.  The end process would be a world where industrial countries will have to do lessArticle 3
54
public spending, will reduce the use of tax expenditures for achieving particular social
objectives, and will also have to reduce the role of specific socially-directed regulations.
The state would have to reduce its role as a direct provider of social protection but, perhaps,
it could (a) supervise compulsory systems of social insurance, as for example, in the area of
pensions; and (b) it could play a larger role in developing markets where they do not exist.
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